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Bora and mora electronic systems are being added to Naval
ships, Many of these systems radiate or receive electromag-
netic (EM) energy. They are all vital parts of a ship and
it is important that each functions properly if the ship is
to accomplish its assortment cf missions. However, it L.z
becoming increasingly difficult to place these systems en
board a ship without their EM radiation interfering with
each ether. This thesis analyzes the EM design problem. It
concludes that a central clearing house for electromagnetic
information is needed which would maintain an up-to-date
data base en electromagnetic problems and solutions, that
shiphcarc personnel need to be more aware cf the EMC
problem, and suggests that more frequent updates cf model
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I. INTBOpqCTION
As tetter equipment is developed, more and mors elec-
tronic systems are being deployed aboard Navy surface shies.
Many cf these systems require antennas That radiate or
receive electromagnetic (EM) energy. As the number of
required antennas increases, placement becomes a problem
because ci the limited amount of space available on a ship,
the fact that a certain amount of isolation is reeded
between the antennas and because other things must be taken
into account sucn as the firing zone of weapon systems,
figures 1.1 and 1.2 from [fief. 1: p. 26 and 23] illustrate
the magnitude of the problem. The placement problem is just
as acute en a carrier as on a typical Naval combatant, in
fact verse due tc the larger requirements an 3 the fact that
most cf the deck must be kept clear for aircraft operations.
The effects cf electromagnetic interference (EMI) on a
ship*s electronic systems can vary from static on a cemmuri-
caticrs circuit and clutter en a radar scope to the complete
disruption cf communications, fire control, and electronic
warfare (EW) systems [fief. 2: p. 3].
Cirectives put cut by the Chief cf Naval Operations
(CNO) give guidance to design engineers on approximately
vhere tc put certain high priority systems antennas.
Unfortunately, communications systems and their associated
antennas are not considered high priority.
The iupcrtance cf communications to an individual ship,
the task group cemmander, and the other commanders above him
cannct be emphasized enough. As iir» Irving Gottlieb, tech-




Historians attribute military victories to outstanding
generals, to clever strategems, to geographic toocg-
rapfcv, certainly to esprit de corps of the ccmtative
personnel, and perhaps tc the fact -chat the defeated
belligerents had the sun in their eyes: they nay also
allude tc weapons superiority, tc food supply, and to
overall logistics. Strangely, we find scant mention of
that element cf warfare which, if absent or malfunc-
tioning can render the other much-qucted attributes
partially cr disastrously ineffective. This all impor-
tant element is communications £Bef. 3: p. 42].
Chapter II looks at some of the systems that are espe-
cially affected fcy electromagnetic energy and presents seme
examples cf problems, cnapter III will examine the design
process that is used tc try and ensure electromagnetic
compatibility, chapter IV lists soiie problem areas in the
design process:, chapter V looks at some of the problems that
cccur after a ship srters the fleet, and chapter VI offers
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Figure 1.2 Antennas en a Carrier Island.
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II. THJ SHIP AND ITS EN VI HON BENT
fis technology advances, we are able to produce equip-
ments that will do ar ever increasing range of things. The
1890 *s saw the irvertion of the wireless, "he 1930*3 saw the
invention of radar, and the 1970's saw the Navy start to use
satellites fcr communications.
Eacn system, in its own exclusive environment, performed
as was expected cf it when developed. However, on board a
ship, the many systems that have been brought together by
necessity, must share the environment with other systems.
The topside of a Navy ship is a conglomeration cf many
systeiis including weapon systems, navigation systems, and
communica liens systens that radiate or receive electromag-
netic (EM) energy. Electromagnetic Compatibility (SMC)
therefore, is becoming an increasing headache fcr tcpside
design engineers as they try to place an increasing number
cf EK systems in a limited amount of space.
A. TEE EKVIEONMENT
The electromagnetic (EM) environment cf a ship car-
affect the ability cf the ship to properly perform its
missions. Physical damage can result from the power of
transmitting systems such as radars and communications
equipment; ordnance can detonate, personnel can be burned
and equipment can bum out. The performance of radar equip-
ment can be reduced due to noise which could cause a false
target tc appear on a screen or equipment to be desensitized
because trigger kills or blankers were used in an effort to
reduce the effect cf noise. Tactical limitations can result
if certain sensors raust be turned off or operated within
very narrow limits ir order to avoid mutual interactions.
14

There ar? two priirary sources of electromagnetic energy
wiiich can affect a ship:
1. Natural which includes terrestrial (atmospheric noise
and precipitation static) and extra-terrestrial
(sclar and cosiric noise) sources and
2. Man-made (equipment emanations from electric tccls to
radar and communications systems) [Bef. 4: p. 1-7].
Cnly the latter can ke controlled by design.
When the electronic systems of a ship are turned on, the
ship
becomes a time-varying electromagnetic system as
goverr.ed £y Maxwell's equations, not approximations for
a static ccerational anvironmsnt [fief. 5: p. 57].
The components cf a ship (propulsion systems, radars,
'•eapcns systems etc) , are usually developed with no specific
ship ir Bind.
In general, subsystem designers do not have a clear
understanding cf the overall ship design process. In
particular, mcst subsystem designers do not knew how
their subsystem impacts the physical characteristics and
cab i litres ofperfcraancs ca
p. 67],
snip as a system [Bef. 6:
Althcugn EMI became a problem when the first communica-
tions equipment started operating, it was not considered a
primary prctlem when compared to accomplishing a mission.
More transmitters and receivers were placed on beard ships
and, by the late 1960's, the problem had become significant
enough that Fleet operations had to take EMI into account.
For example, during the Viet Nam war
In some instances, it was standard practice to shut down
certain search radars and communications transmitters
when missile alert conditions were set in the Gulf of




1 . Ccmjun ic at
i
cis S yst ems
In 1£99, Marconi demonstrated wirsiess ccmmunica-
tions to the U. S. Navy [fief- 8: p. 41 ]• Equipire it was
installed on the USS New York, USS Massachusetts and at a
shore staticn. Since that time, Navy communications
requirements have increased to the point where new every
Navy ship has multiple communications requirements for
voice, data, and message transmissions.
Frequencies are aliccated by the International
Ieleccmmunications Union (ITU), which allocates the
frequency spectrum tc the ccuntries of the world. Ihe U. 3.
in turn allccates frequencies for different uses, such as
amatuer hands, citizen's radic, broadcasting, fixed, aero-
nautical racio navigation, land mobile, meteorological aids,
satellites, and government utilization. Formal allocation
helps tc avcid mutual interference.
Navy ships utilize several different bands of
frequencies depending on where a ship wants to transfer
information. Because atmospheric attenuation (weakening o:
signal) increases as frequency increases, lower frequencies
such as HF (high frequency) are used for longer range cvg~-
the-hcrrzen (OTH) communications. Higher frequencies sucn
as VHF (very high frequency) and UHF (ultra high frequency)
are used fcr shorter line-of-sight (LOS) communications,
Table I defines the list of frequency bands [fief- 9: p.,
1-2].
Ihe higher the frequency used the more data can be
transmitted per channel as wider bandwidths are possible at
higher frequencies. For instance, the bandwidth between two
and three GHz is much wider than the bandwidth between two
and three MHz. Data rates can be shown by Shannon's Law :
16

C = 3.32 H log (1+ (S/N) ) , (Eqn. 2.1)
where C = the maximun number of bits/seccrd;
H = bandwidth; and
S/N = signal to noise ratio.
The Navy uses satellites (satellite use is consid-
ered ICS) in order tc take advantage of the higher frequency
tands, such as UHF and SHF, and the higher data rates
possible at these frequencies. Satellites, however, are
eubject to naif uncticns and cannot be depended upon in
wartime situations. Therefore, ships carry a variety or
ccramuricaticns equipment and antennas in order tc use
several cands of frequencies at one time. Some OHF and VHF
frequencies are utilized within a battle group so that the
ships can communicate with each other with a reduced risk of
teing detected by the enemy. HF is used for lenger
distances of several hundred miles.
Cptimum antenna lengths vary as it depends en the
frequency it is beirg used for. The lower the rand of
frequency, the longer the antenna length. The length cf the
antenna is calculated by:
X = C/f, (Eqn. 2.2)
where \= the wavelength;
c = the speed of light; and

















emely lew frequencies) 30-300 Hz
low f reau encies) 3-30 kHz
freguercies), 30-300 kHz
um frequencies) .3-3 MHZ
frequencies) 3-30 MHz
high frequencies) 30-300 MHz
a high frequencies) 300-3000 MHz
r high frequencies) 3-30 GHz
emely high frequencies) 30-300 GHz
The ideal antenna is a quarter-wave vertical
antenna. The EF spectrum is from 2-30 MHz so the 2 MHz
frequency requires an antenna 123 feet in length and the 30
KHz frequency requires an antenna which is 8.2 feet long.
The 123 ft. antenna is too large to realistically place en a
ship sc the Navy has adopted a 35 foot vertical (whip)
antenna as its standard HF antenna. -.-cnr« a3 f CrAnt en: ether
frequencies are of different sizes and shapes, the Un?
antenna AVWSC-3 ~s a dish type antenna, but they alsc pese
placenent problems on board a ship as, if they are ar. LOS
band antenna they nnst have an unobstructed view of its
appropriate target.
2 • Radars
Radars have two primary functions, surveillance and
tracking. A surveillance or search radar searches a volume
cf space and repcrts the detection of targets. A tracking
radar determines the time history cf a targe*:. It must be
given the initial pointing information in order to acquire
and lock en a target. The target will then be tracked an til
it is nc lenger considered of interest.
18

There are three types of radars -chat do both
surveillance and tracking:
1. A track- while-scan radar correlates detection reports
as the radar continuously scans.
2. A track radar with search capability can search a
vclume of space and detect a target. If a detection
is made, the radar can aim its antenna beam in the
direction of the target. This type of system can
usually track cnly one target a: a time.
3. Agile bean or inertialess beam steering has the flex-
ibility to schedule its search or track functions in
any directior as needed. Its antennas are not
constrained to rotate at a fixed rate, hence it can
detect tracks anywhere in its detection volume snd
still perform a surveillance function.
Within the above mentioned types of radars are 2D
and 3C radars. A 31 radar measures targe-, range, azimuth,
and elevaticn. A 2D radar measures target range and one
angle. Fcr example, a radar that measures range and h~:.ght
is sometimes called a heightf inder.
There are tvc approaches to identifying targets,
Selective Identification Friend/Identification Friend cr Foe
<SIF/Ifr) and Space Cfcject Identification (SOI). Ar. SIF/IFF
radar sends out a ceded series of pulses that triggers a
transpender en the target. The target sends neck a reply
(if friendly) as tc target identification, range and alti-
tude. An air traffic control (ATC) radar is an example of
this system. An SCI system uses what is known as s skin
return. It illuminates orbiting satellites at. a high data
rate resulting in ai amplitude versus time history of the
target. The reflected signal is analyzed to determine




Radar frequencies are allocated by the International
Telecommunications Onion (ITU) to the countries of the
world. With its allocated radar frequencies, the U. S.
controls certain bands for certain purposes so that the
different radar equipment do not interfere with each ether.
These frequencies are specified in caapter 4 of [Ref. 10]
end are listed in Tafcle II .
Chapter 5 of [Ref. 10] contains the criteria for
certain ecuipmert characteristics 10 ensure an acceptable
degree cf IMC among radar and ether systems sharing the
frequency spectrum. The criteria are combined with opera-
tional requirements such as power, sensitivity, pulse
repetiticr. rate (PRR)
,
pulse duration, pulse rise time, and

















radar frequencies. Then, depending on the use of the parti-
cular radar system (short, medium or leng range) cthe:
factors i est be considered.
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Atmospheric attenuation increases as frequency
increases due mainly to microwave absorption caused by
oxygen and water vapor, so lew frequencies (VHF, UHF, and L
bands) are used for long range radars (distances greater
than 100 nautical miles) while high frequencies are used for
mediuoi and short ranee radars. Medium range radars (50-100
nm) operate in the S and C bands while ' short range radars
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Figure 2. 1 Atmospheric Attenuation.
[fief- 11: p. 14]. Figure 2.1 from [ Ref . 9: p. 28-26] shows
the atmospheric attenuation coefficients for several condi-
tions as a function of wavelength for window regions of the




C. CJOSIS CF PROBLEMS
1 - Eroadband Noise
Ercadband ncise is generated ny the ship's hull and
ether structures near high power radiating sources such as
HF communications transmitters. The noise is characterized
ty inter nit tent noise bursts (similar to those generated by
electrical storms) that can affect portions cf the ccmuni-
catiens and radar freguency spectrums. Broadband ncise can
te generated by loose points cf contact at metallic junc-
tions that are subjected to radio frequency (RF) currents
from transmitting antennas. These currents can cause arcing
at the junction. Cther sources of noise include metallic
cfcjects vihich carry induced RF currents and which rub or
touch each cther intermittently while antennas are radi-
ating. When the metallic objects make and break contact,
spikes cf ncise are produced.
2- Intermodular icn
It is important tc understand a little about inter-
modulaticn interference (IMI) because it can cause a
consideratle amcunt cf problems. Intermcduiaticn interfer-
ence can disrupt the operation of receivers in three tays:
1. If the IMI amplitudes are higher than what the
receivers can optimally riandle, the sensitivity of
the receiver will be reduced,
2. IKI can mask cther communications signals cf interest
ty being en cr near the frequency of those signals,
and,
3. IMI compenents can be mistaken for true signals
[Bef. 12: p. 209].
Intermcduiaticn (IH) products are generated when two
cr mere radic transnitters induce RF currents through non-
linear junctions in the ship's hull and superstructure such
22

as ccrrcded or rusty joints cr bolts. This is commonly
called the ••rusty belt" affect. The non-linear junctions
create IM products which are reradiated by the ship's struc-
ture, this produces undesired frequencies, some cf which
interfere with signals that the ship wishes -co receive.
If f1 and f2 are two fundamental frequencies that
are transmitted ty the ship, intermodulaticn products will
te generated which are sums and differences cf integral














2f 1 +/- 2f2
3f ' 1 V- f2


















frequency combinations possible for the first 5 harrrcrics.
The type cf non-linear junctions usually found aboard ship
produce edd-crdered harmonic products that are much stronger
than these cf even-cidered harmenics.
The number of inter modulation products increases as
product cider and the number of transmitters increase as
shown by Table IV frcm [Ref. 8: p. 44].
Eve-n if different equipment operate in different
frequency rands cf the spectrum, IM products could interfere









NUMBE R OF ODD ORDER PRODUCTS
3 5 7 9 11 13
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 6 10 14 18 22 26
3 19 51 99 163 243 339
4 44 180 476 996 1,804 2.S34
5 85 501 1.765 4,645 10,165 19,605
6 146 1.182 5,418 17.718 46,530 104,910
7 231 2.471 14,407 57,799 180.775 474,215
8 344 4.712 34,232 166,344 814,680 1,866,280
9 489 8,361 74,313 432.073 1,871,845 6,539,625
10 870 14,002 149,830 1.030,490 5,188,590 20,758,530
«ith cnly 2 transmitters radiating. As the product orders
increase, the signal strength decreases. 3ut if the
decreased signal of a product is as strong as a weak signal
fceing detected {for example SKF communications during incle-
ment weather) the irter fearence problem can only be resolved
by removing the source of the interference.
Table V is taken from CINCPACPLT INSTRUCTION 9407.1
cf 9 June 1561 and lists some of the typical causes of hull
generated I£I.
C. EZAHEIES OF EROBIEHS
This section lists some unclassified examples cf prob-




Typical Causes of IMI
accommodation ladders garbage chutes
antenna pedestals gratings
Handrailsanrcrec cable
awning supports heist cades
belaying pins (signal jackstaf f
s
flag halyards)
beat cradles ladd ers
beat gripes





life raft holders and
racKS
bocms (refueling and car go) masts
carle clamps radar waveguide flanges
cabinets rigging
canopy supports rusty or corroded belts




davits storage racks and bins
dissimilar metal joints swiveis
deers tackle
drainpipes transmission lines
expansion joints turn b ickles
f srro-magnetic hardware waveguides








The AN/SP5-10 radar, which operates in the C band,
causes interference in HF receivers. The interfer-
ence had the characteristic sound of the 6H/SES-10
(€25-650 pulse repetition rate (?SH) } in the 19 MHz
to 28 HHz range, [Ref. 8: p. 46].
Emanations from the Hk 68 gun fire control system
(GFCS) of the AN/SPG-53 radar bounced off of its
associated topside structure which acted as an HF
transmitting antenna, and reradiated the emanations
cf the GFCS masking incoming low-level communications
signals, [Ref- 8: p. 46J.
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The AN/SJS-37/43 radar causes interference tc the
majority cf tcpside electronic receivers. The 37/43
series radar generates broadband energy via ar. arc
discharge occurring in either the antenna rotary
jcint and/or loose metallic ixeins in the radar* s main
team. Arc-type energy is detected on receivers oper-
ating above 3.5 GHz. The 43 radar operates at 225
Mfcz. On at least one ship, energy from the 2-6 KHz
HF transmitting antenna caused IK products to be
produced off cf nearby flight deck flood lights.
When the AN/SPS-43 radar was operated in excess of
100 kw, the emanations combined with the IK radia-
ticns to cause arcing in all the joints of the flood
lights and flccd light structures, [Ref. 8: p. 46].
Kutual interference between the AN/3PS-37/-40/-43 UHF
radars and all (JH? communications, such as the
AN/SRC-20/-21 and AN/*iSC-3, can cause lost messages
and prevent effective target detection and tracking,
[Bef. 13: p. 8-14].
Mutual interference from multiple weapons control
radars can cause self jamming to weapons control
systems, [2ef. 8: p. 8-16].
Pulsed radars can cause an overload on Electronic
Warfare (EW) systems operations and inter femes which
can prevent detection of signals of interest ty elec-
tronic surveillance measures/electronic
ccuntermeasures (ESM/ECK) systems, [Ref- 13: p.
8-19].
Link 11 transmissions and the AN/SPQ-9 (Mk 86) system
have been shown to degrade the AN/SPN-35's ability to
provide a stabilized precision approach for landing
aircraft, [Ref. 13: p. 8-22].
The AN/3PS-37/-43 air search radars have caused false
alarm shut dc*r.s on AN/SPN-41 elevation transmitters,
26

less cf glide slope display during Automated Carrier
Landing Systen (ACLS) operations by pilots, and
spoking interference on the AN/SPN-43 Marshalling
radar display scope preventing proper detection and
ccntrcl of aircraft, [Ref. 13: p. 8-24].
9. When a radar is pointing toward a fiat surface,
energy is reflected from the flat surface to a target
which returns to the radar system as a false target
in the direction of the obstruction so that the oper-
ator sees t»c targets on his display, only one cf
which is real, [Ref- 8: p. 47].
1C. Cn some ships the AN/SPS-10 radar is located or the
after mast. To see forward it has tc lock through
several obstructions. Also, two communications
antennas cn either side of the radar interfere with
its cceraticn, [Ref. 8: p. 48].
11. There have Deen cases where radar emissions from
ships being replenished at sea have caused the
winch-control mechanisms on the replenishment ship tc
operate independently (out of control), [Ref. 2: p.
33-
The above were recorded examples of EM problems. fthiie
most cf them did not seem tc be life threatening, they could
affect the combat capability of a ship. Figure 2.2 from
[Ref. 5: p. 62] is from an article on combat capability
assessment. The article illustrated the possibility cf the
electromagnetic environment degrading the tracking ability
cf an acquisition radar by as much as 20 % if time tc go
(TGO) was specified as the earliest time to detect a given
target and a 50 % probability of acquisition is assumed.
The dark right hand curve shows the radar's ability tc track
in free space and the dotted line depicts the degraded capa-
bility. The change due to the EM environment is calculated
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This chapter begins with an overview of the design
process fcr the topside configuration of a surface ship.
5. THE DESIGN PHASE
Eefcre a ship is tuilt, there must, ce a need for it, the








Figure 3. 1 Planning Phase of the PPBS.
purpose. This first step is illustrated in figure 3.1 and
fcegirs when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issue the Joint
Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) which
e
rcvides the advice of the JCS to the President. the
National Security, and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
on the military strategy and force structure reauired to
attain the national security cojectives of tHe United
States [Ref. 1U: p. 4-11].
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The SECCEF later issues the Defense Guidance, a document
which provides the guidelines that must be observed by the
JCS, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies in the
formulation of fores structures and the Five Year Defense
Elan (FYEF) , especially with respect to fiscal constraints.
This guidance is based upon the JSPD, as amended, to reflect
decisions irade by the President or these made by SF.CDF.F.
Along with the other services, the Navy submits its Program
Cbjectives Memorandum (POM) which expresses the Navy's
requirements in terms of force structure, manpower, material
and costs to satisfy ail assigned responsibilities and
functions during the period of the FYDP.
1
-
£NO Leve_i ? 1 a r ni ng
after considering the Navy*s requirements over the
FYDP, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) matches his assets
to th€ requirements by assigning specific missions to his
platforms (ship, submarines and aircraft). If it is discov-
ered that a new platfcrm is needed, i.e. a ship, the initial
design process begins. The mission and requirements for the
desired ship are defined and an Operational Requirement (CR)
cr a Required Operational Capability (ROC) is issued.
2 feasibility study is done to determine if a ship
can be designed that will meet the OR/ROC and other const-
raints such as size, cost, manning and propulsion. The
study also identifies the major technical risks associated
with alternative designs and provides the basis for setting
a design to cost target.
Next a conceptual design is done to develop a
Conceptual Easeline (CBL) Package which includes design
raticnale, weight estimates, weapons equipment list, manning
list, electronics space, general arrangements drawings and
topside arrangements among its 16 areas of coverage. A
draft Top Level Requirement (TLB) is another conceptual
30

design product and defines the operational requirements of
the ship to be produced, the ship's mission, configuration
constraints, manning limitations, maintenance and supply
concepts, and minimum operational standards.
It c€fines what the user (OFNAV) expects front the
product as obtained from the producer, the Naval
Material Command (NM.1AT) [Hef. 15: p. 66],
This corresponds to block 1 of figure 3.2 froia [ Hef . 15: p.
66].
Hefirement of the TLB. occurs through an iterative
process involving OPSAV, NAVHAT and the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) tc ensure that there is a clear under-
standing of the requirements, that they can cs met, and that
the ship can be produced with present technology and
resources it a timely manner (blocK 2 of figure 3.2).
Conceptual design is followed by the preliminary
design whese objectives are :
1. to achieve a complete engineering description of an
integrated ship system such that the basic ship size
and definition will not change during contract
design;
2. tc achieve 3 functional definition of integrated
subsystems selected for optimization of total ship
performance and cost;
3. provide a technical baseline called a functional
Easeline (FBL) for the Defense Systems Acquisition
and Review Council (DSARC) II process;
4. to assur? definition of the ship to the level
required for a Class C cost estimate (lowest budget
quality estimate)
;
5. tc select final design criteria for characteristics
such as roisi and ship protection consistent with











































figure 3.2 2M Systeis Portion of the Ship Design Process.
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6. tc confirm the design-to-cost goal, and;
7. validation of selected subsystems [fief- 16: p. 29].
2- BAVSEA l€yel Planning
lh€ Top la7&l Specification (TLS) (block 2 or figure
2.2) is en output of the preliminary design and states what
NAVSEA as xhe cognizant producer (for NAVMAT), intends to
provide as a solution to OPNAV.
Cnce the preliminary design is approved, it is
translated into a contractual package and put out to bid.
^. 3 A Villi l££Ut
Although NAVSEA is the responsible producer
(designer and manager) for NAVMAT for the overall ship, the
Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) is responsible
for the interiors of the communications, electronics ccur-
termeasures (ECM) and intelligence spaces as well as the
associated antennas.
CfcC docunents such as the ILH or the CPHAV approved
Ship Characteristics will state specifically each antenna
that fcill be used by surface and air search radars, naviga-
tion, ECM, target illumination/tracking, identification
friend or foe (IFF) and so on. These antennas can be speci-
fied because they are the latest generation available. If
an antenna is in the research and development (R£D) phase,
that is taken into account and its anticipated space and
weight are allotted en the shipboard material listing and
topside design analysis so that the new antenna can be used
when it becomes available. (block 3 of figure 3.2).
The selection of communications equipment is made by
NAVELEX utilizing guidance from documents such as NWP (Naval
Warfare Publication) 11-1 , "Characteristics and Capabilities
of US Navy Combatant Ships" and NWP (Naval Warfare
r-ublicaticn) 4, "Basic Operational Communications Doctrine".
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A shi?*s mission areas are evaluated and the appro-
priate ccnmunication system needed to support each area is
selected. A circuit analysis is done tc categorize each
circuit as to usage, frequency range, transmit/receive,
emmission mode, simplex/duplex and so en. In additicn,
circuits are looked at in terms of which need dedicated
equipner.t and which night be able to snare equipment. Once
the needed circuits have been established, equipment such as
tuneis, patching equipment, antennas, mul ticouplers, tran-
smitters and receivers are chosen to satisfy tie circuit
requirements and block 3 of figure 3.2 is completed. NAVSEA
prepares a preliminary topside configuration conplete with
the placement of radar systems and forwards this to NAV2LEX
for their recommendations on the placement of communications
antennas (block 4 of figure 3.2).
After NAVELEX determines the communications equip-
ment that will be used, the Naval Ocean Systems Center
(NOSC) in San Ciegc, California or Chu Associates in Si
Cajor, California is tasked with building a 1/4Sth scale
trass model of the proposed ship from tne wat-riine up based
en Melded Offset Drawings for actual hull configuration and
Compartment and Access (C&A) Drawings for actual superstruc-
ture configuration. All structures that coald affect the
electromagnetic (EM) environment in the high frequency (HF)
spectrum are modeled.
Curing the construction of the disss model, engi-
neering judgement is used to select fsasicie locations for
communications antennas using preliminary NAVSEA topside
drawings.
Khen the brass model has been completed, the actual
placement of broadband HF antennas is started. The process
involves measurirg antenna impedance to establish adherence
to associated equipment requirements. When an acceptable
design is achieved, actual impedance matching components can
te calculated for actual ship installation.
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These tests are done on a model range with the brass
model placed on a rotatable 20-foot diameter platter capacle
cf simulating different sea states- based on test measure-
ments, changes ii antenna location can be made fairly easily
en the topside structure of the model. Eventually, an
optimum artsnna placement arrangement may be obtained.
According to [Ref. 17: p. 40] brass modeling
detail
ccst or
will accommodate ar.y degree of superstructure
without a corresponding increase in the
complexity of measuring the oerformance of individual
antennas. Also, once a detailed brass model is in
inventory, the model measurement approach is a guick,
reliable and accurate means of determining the impact or
proposed alterations to the ship topside structure cr
antenna arrangement
Cnce a model has been built, ether benefits can be
achieved including verification of weapon firing cut-cut
zones, acceptability of radar locations as related to turn
radius, potential radiation hazards (3ADHAZ) solutions, and
identification cf intermodulation interference (IMI) prob-
lems. An electromagnetic compatibility (EJ1C) analysis can
be dene if proposed communications equipments are known, to
identify required intersystem isolation.
The model range can only make measurements for the
placement of ~dF antennas. The measured data is extrapolated
in order to acquire data for antennas of other frequency
spectrums, such as VKF and SHF. The extrapolated data has
proven to be accurate enough to continue using this leans of
measurement.
The UOSC inventory of models presently represents
about S5* cf the active fleet by ship class.
The data obtained from the model range studies is
used ty NAVELEX to help provide an external communications
arrangement sketch tc NAVSEA in its task of accomplishing
the ship tcpside design and topside antenna systems
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arrangements (blccks 4 and 5 of figure 3.2). At this point,
the placement of weapon systems, the location and form of
stacks, tie quantity and structure of the masts, etc., can
still be changed by K2VSEA.
Seme of the things that NAVSEA must keep ir. mind
when ccir.c a topside antenna arrangement (block 5 of figure
3.2) are:
1. weapon systems locations and the resultant firing cut
cut zones of guns and missiles
2. radar antenna placement
3. propulsion exhaust stacks
4. 1ACAH and other aircraft related systems
5. mast and y?irdarm configurations
6. deck house locations
7. car-go handling equipment, ladders, lifelines, and
stanchions
3. HF and UHF transmit and receive antenna locaticns
9. IS£ antenn-is
10- wcrkir.g zones which must oe kept clear such as
aircraft takeoff and landings, boat handling and
replenish nent
The antenna placements must meet necessary EMC stan-
dards cf EMI, radiation hazards to personnel and crdnance
(HERC) , slectomagnetic pulse (EMP), electromagnetic environ-
ment JEHi), and electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV) ( block 6
cf figure 3. 2* .
The various KAVSEA functional codes (opacifications
coordination, hull, ship, and combat systems) and a recent
addition, an EMC task group manager (TGM) (see Figure 3.3
from [fief. 18: p. 56] ), work together utilizing tradeoff
studies to determine topside configurations that ccme


























Figure 3.3 NAVSEA Organizational Structure.
Hit ernatives , along with the risks and def icier.cies
cf th€ different configurations are given to the Ship Design
Manager <SDM) (block 7 of figure 3.2) or Ship Acquisition
Project Manager (SHAPM), who has the prerogative of
accepting the proposed arrangement or reallocating space,
weight and power to achieve a certain performance level.
The SDM's choice cf configuration becomes the Easeline
Arrangement Drawing. It is refined (block 8 of figure 3.2)
with necessary changes due to policy decisions concerning
ship ccst, size and Banning. Other system commands such as
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and NAVELEX either
participate in the ccrfiguration refinements, mainly through
Topside Design Information Exchange Team (TDIET) meetings,




Eevised and updated topside configuration drawings
are £zss>~c cut tc all cognizant NAVSEA codes for assessment,
to NAVAIB for input en aircraft operations and to NAVELEX
for comments. The approved final drawings are included in
documentation that is used fcr ship acquisition (block 9 of
figure 3.2). Future revisions or changes durrng ship-
tuiidirg cr modernization such as ECP's (engineering change




IV. PBOBLJM ABEAS IN THE DESIGN PHASE
New that th€ design process has been reviewed, some
problem areas will be discussed.
Present CNO directives give priority to virtually all
systems tut communications. While it is true that communi-
cations as such are net a main mission of a ship when
compared to anti-air warfare (AAW) , anti-submarine warfare
1ASW) , cr anti-surface warfare (ASUW) , a commander cannot
perform his command and control function without proper
communications support.
Ire aajcr prcblen in placing communications antennas on
a ship is the limited amount of real estate that can be
used. Cr land, a Naval Communications Station (NAVCCMMSTA)
could have its receiving and transmitting antennas separated
by miles cf land. A Navy ship does net have such freedem so
places must be found amid the ether ship ill uminc tors and
obstructions to place communications antennas in a least
ccmprcmisinc area.
There appear to ce no limits of degradation specified if
an object is placed somewhere in the beam pattern cf an
illuminator. A general limit cf so many decrees from the
lain team cr other point of departure is used but it is not
always clear if this limit was chosen on the safe side cr if
it is a critical limit. & few degrees may not matter tc the
actual beam pattern cf an illuminator but it could have a
major impact on where the illuminator or an object such as
an antenna may be placed. As an example, if a radar has a
specified cieararce cf 40 degrees on either side of its main
team tut the best that can be found is a place with 38 cr 39
degrees cf clearance, either a new site must be found or a
cemprcmise agreed on. Mr. Visvaldis Mangulis, who conducted
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syst€ir analyses of the AEGIS combat system including
computer simulation cf radar blockage by ship's superstruc-
ture arcard the CG-47, CSGN, CGN-9, and CGN-42, suggests
that
During ship design one may have to decide between
several fire contrcl radar configurations in which ens
or mere of the radars are blocked. Consequently, it is
necessary to develcp methods by which the blockage car.
be graded [Ref. 19: p-77].
Frier tc a biass model being buj.it, it appears that a
ship*s tcpside configuration has already been settled en by
NAVSEA such that the enly thing that can oe done by NAVE1EX
is tc place the communications antennas around their as
NAVEIEX's trass model study is done using the initial
topside cenf iguratior done by NAVSEA. However, several
iterations may take place before a final design is agreed
upon as ir blocks 4-7 of figure 3.2, the NAVSEA design team
cr the 5CK/SHAPM can move elements around such as propulsion
stacks, weacens launchers and ladders. Therefore, the final
topside design could vary markedly from the configuration
used for the model study. Although calculated impacts lay
be dene, cne of the reasons fcr the orass mcdel study is its
history of fairly accurate measurements.
Erass nicdei studies model the lead ship of a class.
These studies are not usually redone if only so called siror
topside changes are made or planned. This is especially
true when follow-on ships cf a new class get minor changes
nade tc them. It is hard to believe that every ship in a.
particular class has a topside configuration so close to
that cf the lead ship that follow on model studies are not
required.
The SHAFM/SDH dees not have to use any of the recom-
mended topside configurations given to nim. Though so much
effort was expended on careful tradeoffs and compromises
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into the present design, it may be changed to suit someone's
idea cf what the ship should look like.
The TEIZT meetings are an important arena in which to
discuss possible prcilems. Design teams from different
NAVSEA grcups (such as hull, machinery, weapons, and ccmfcat
systems) and NAVELE2 (representing the intelligence, ECU,
and ccmirur icaticrs systems) try to de-ermine if all systems
are placed compatifcly. If a possible conflict arises
between two systems, the system with the higher priority
will usually win out. This may not always be the test way
to solve things . Some of the conflicts should be investi-
gated to determire the extent of the problem before a final
decision is made.
Though figure 3.2 shows the general steps taken in the
topside design process, there appears to be no check cff
list cr formal agreeuent on how things get done. Whatever
is done is accepted as "standard practice". This nay work
as lcng as thers are people at NAVSEA and NAVELEX who have
many years cf experience but what will happen when they
leaved According to Cr* 3. Leopold [Sef- 20: p. <*1], from
1951 to 1952 the Bureau of Ships (3USHIP5) (froa which
evolved NAVSEA) hired 250 engineers from 58 universities,
many cf whom are in leading positions with NAVSEA. In 1977,
NAVSEC (the ship design arm which merged into NAVSEA in
1979) could only hire 25 Engineers in Training (EITs) .
There seems to he a de-emphasis on in-houss technical
work with 12% of the work being contracted cut in 1978-79
[Ref. 21: p. 105]. The in-house people have had to manage
the cutside contractcrs as well as do their own technical
work with the result being that only about 10^ of the work
dona in-hcuse was of a technical nature. There may be no
pronlsm presently if experienced people are doing the
managing, but how will the new people who are coming in each
year, as small as their numbers are, gain technical
41

expertise with so much concentration on outside contracting
and the management cf it. There will soon be 5 lack of
competent NAVSEA managers who possess the technical knew how
and experience required of today's managers. Commenting on
the Navy's ability tc design ships, Mr. William H. Hundley
cf CDI Marine Co. stated that
In 1970, when the design that became the FFG-7 was first
beinc considered, the Navy in-house ship design organi-
zation had not designed a surface combatant fcr
years. Ihe single package procurement process was still
very much in vegue, and preparations were beina made tc
>rccr
06],
prccur<= the new PF by tne * same process [Ref. 22: ?.
Mr. Hundley was acting Chief Naval Architect at the tine and
went en xc say
After 1C years of Fleet support engineering and moni-
toring cf Sesians teing performed by other agencies, it
was becoming very apparent that unless the procurement
process was changsa and the Navy's ships designed
m-hcuse again. the ship design capability of the Navy
would be rapidly lest.
Miii-ary Standards (MIL STD's) need quicker and acre
fregusnt up dating in certain areas. [Hef. 23: p. 2-9]
states that the MII-STD-461A Characteristics Requirements
for Equipment revision was started in May 1970. T're B
versicn was scheduled to be out 29 Jan 1973, after mere than
7 1/2 years cf revision. It was finally published in April
1980, Cne noted reason for delay is that if an activity is
unable tc resolve a disagreement, the problem is fcrwarded
to a higher authority which could add six weeks tc the
schedule
.
NELC TC 356 (Naval Electronic Laboratory Center
Technical Dccument-the command is now known as the Naval
Ccean System Center, NOSC) of 1 Sep 74 is one document that
could use an update as it is a primary source of guidance
for placirg shipboard antennas.
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Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) versus Contractor
Furnished Equipment (CFE) could be a problem as the
contractor sometimes has the latitude of selecting equipment
ether than GFE. This may lead to future EMI problems if
mainterarce is difficult or equipment malfunctions and
spares are not available.
According to [Eef. 23: p. 2-12] there is no one source
that has all the EMI data on GFE, it is scattered throughout
activities. On the F-13 aircraft program, data en the 31
major GFE's had to be collected from 7 Navy technical activ-
ities. Valuable tine can be wasted trying to locate what
facility has what data. The longer it takes to acquire the
needed information, the longer it will be before productive
work, can be started.
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V- IICBLjaS CCCOjaiNG AFTER THE START OF OPERATIONS
In spite of the painstaKing effort expended in devel-
oping the topside design configuration cf a ship, problems
can easily arise after the ship has been placed in opera-
tion. Most cf -chase problems are due nor to design tut to a
lack cf knowledge on the part of the users of the varicus
commur icaticns a r.d radar systems.
Cr.e source of IM problems arises from the trash left on
decks. Ihings such as soda cans and foil wrappers can cause
havoc when transmitting systems are turned on; especially
when the ship is operating in less than ideal sea state and
weather conditions. Befiecticns off of moving objects, such
as rcliirg soda cans, can cause false or inaccurate readings
en receiving systems.
Maintenance, or the lack of it, is a primary cause of
problems. Eersonnei assigr.sd to do the job are net always
the brightest cf j.eople and their attitude toward the
assigned chores may not enhance a ship's electronic capa-
bility. If careful monitoring is not done, =ven a
well-intentioned effort may have no positive effect. For
example, one ship traced its prooiem to the topside antenna
systeir. Ar inspection showed the main wires to the fan
antenna to ice in very good condition but the associated
shorting wires had been neglected for some time.
Maintenance personnel did not think the shorting wires were
part cf the antenna system.
Seme equipment, especially those with EMI shielding
inside the case, are held together with a large number of
screws. Often when maintenance or a repair action is dene




the practice of fastening only one or two retainers en a
dcci ci drawer, 01 of tightening only one or two screws
to hold a side or tack panel, will invariable result ir
a less cf effective EMI' shielding, both from within, and
intc, the equipment [Ref. 13: p. 6-4].
When a ship has *hat it thinks is an EMC-related problem
that shifts company cannot solve, assistance can be sought
from the type commander (TYCOM) or a nearby mobile technical
unit (MCTU) . This can be done on as informal a oasi^ as a
telephone call- If the source of the problem is ::cund,
recommendations are nade to the ship on how best to proceed.
If a piece of eguipment is recommended to la referred
defective via a casualty report (CASREFT) , the ship must
take the initiative in sending out the message. However,
according to personnel associated with the waterfront
corrective action program (WCAP) at MOTU 5 located in San
Ciegc, California, seme commanding officers are reluctant to
send cut CASREPTs unless the snip cannot function properly
without the piece cf eguipment. In contrast, if a propeller
shaft or toiler were defective and the ship could not carry
cut its assigned missions, those problems would be reported.
Eut, if a piece cf communication equipment were only
partially defective and the ship could still carry cut its
primary missions, the communications eguipment would net be
reported.
Ih€ feeling appears to be that if everything that was
defective was reported via a CASREPI, there would be so many
that it wculd leck bad for the ship. This appears to be the
reason that some commanding officers try tc minimize the
number of CASREPTs sent out. As a rssuit, some pieces of
eguipment may never function properly because they never
receive the apprcpriate attention given a CASEEPT.
additional eguipment that was not taken into account for
during the design phase is often added tc the ship fcr shcrt
periods cf time. This cculd cause EMI problems due to
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reflecticis cff of the added equipment cr degradation in
existing systems due to blockages caused by the additional
eguipiiert.
When a ship is designed, it is done with just a general
plan ir mind. Designers are far removed from the process
which determines which ship serves in the Atlantic or
Pacific area. Depending on which coast a ship is homeported
to, different external pieces of gear may be added.
Fcr example, ships serving en the Atlantic coast make
deployment tours to the Mediterranean area. One cf the
requirements when in a Mediterranean port is to hang strings
cf lights from the bow up the mast and down to the stern of
the ship. These are called Med lights and are put up only
when in port and taken down when the ship leaves port.
Curing the time a ship is in port the strings of wires used
for the RED lights can cause problems fcr a ship's communi-
cations systems. As they are in effect another antenna,
they can reradiate transmissions the ship may send cut and
may interfere with the original transmissions.
When Earines are embarked on amphibious ships, they
have their cwn communications requirements. Sometimes the
host ship will rot cave enough assets to cover the Marine
requirements so the Karines ask for permission to add their
cwn gear to that of the ship's. When permission is received
from the appropriate authority, UHP and VHf equipment may be
added to that of the ship's existing inventory cf equipment.
It is not hard tc conceive cf the possible problems that may
cccur.
Eroadfcand communication antennas are modeled prior to
installation on board ships but, as changes are made tc a
ship superstructure, the data obtained from the model study
is no longer valid for placing the antennas.
For a variety cf reasons, individual ships have net been
modeled en a regular oasis, Classes of ships have besn
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modeled hut guite often the model that is prepared
reflects proposed modernization or proposed Shipalt
(ship alteration) packages which are not completed in
total cr are deferred, vrith the end result that the ship
and the mcdel ro Ictger agree [fief, 24; p. 43].
Two classes of ships which have had problems with their
twin-fan antennas are the CG-27 and DDG-2 classes. Ihe
trass models of these classes were updated in order to
develcj: r.ew impedance matching requirements or a new ar.terna
design.
However,, tecause both of these ships were also slated
for majjer meder rizatr.ons, the imcedarce latching
reguir enents were icdeled against the future configura-
tion cf the ship. As a conseguence, the ships er.tered
industrial upkeep csrieds and nad their poorly operating
twin far antennas restored to like new ccnaitior ana
returned to the fleet with poorly matched impedance. The
net result to the ship was degraded operation which
limits lcng haul ccimun.ication capability [fief. 24: p.
43].
In spite cf the careful process used in the design phase
for placing systems and their antennas on beard a ship,
sometimes ncn-eiect rcmagnet ic requirements are ccnproirised.
In addition, changes can be made to a design without NAVS2A
knowledge. The following examples illustrate the bread
nature cf the problem.
1. A FG class ship (This ship is no lenger in service)
was modified by someone who tncught it wculd look
mere streamiired if the whip antenna in front of the
propulsion stack was to tilt back slightly like the
stack. The design change worked as long as the ship
was in forward motion but problems occurred when the
ship was at a standstill. Then the hot exhaust
rising from the stack would heat the antenna tc temp-
eratures over 500 degrees causing breakage. The




2. On cruisers of the Leahy Class, (CG 16 to 24) ; th*
Truxtun Class, (CGN 35); and the California Class
(CGN 36-37) , tew mounted discone antennas were placed
in such a position that they obstructed the forward
missile launcher, [Hef. 25: p. 3].
3. The USS Eaintridge, (CGN 25), was fitted with a
pedestal- nounted receivirg antenna which was directly
lecated in ficnt of its forward missile launcher,
[Bef. 25: p. 3].
i*. The Eelknap Class cruisers (CG 26 tc 3<4) , were fitted
with a trussed-whip antenna on the fantaii that
violated the clear space requirement of the 5-inch




The ever increasing magnitude of the EMI prcfclem
requires that if we are to have a properly f uncticr.rr.g ship
for the fleet, we nust find the funds to do whatever is
necessary to ensure an environment in which detlc^ed
equipnent can operate as they were intended.
Funds are needed for an all-encompassing EMI data base
to stcie and update EMC related problems. lime would be
saved ty many activities in being able to retrieve irfcria-
ticr. frcm the one data case. NAVSEA already has a SEMCIP
data base of reported fleet EMI problems so an expansion of
that is a possibility. with other EMI information, such as
tha* en GEE, added to it, the SEMCI? data case could be a
cne step clearing house of EM information. However, funding
will te needed tc expand the data base, keep it u? to date,
and tc make the information more readily available tc activ-
ities closer to the fleet such as the HOTUs and Naval
shipyards. Since many of the problems would be of a classi-
fied rature, it nay be necessary to estaoiish a small secure
network, possibly using the proposed Defense Data Network
(DDN), that would enable the MOTUs ready access 24 hours a
day tc the EMI data.
Eucget limitations have prevented updates to specifica-
tions. Ihese updates are important because current cr.es are
cut cf date [Ref. 26: p. 2-4]. At present, acquisition
managers cannot rely en the military standards tc adequately
ccntrcl EMI design en new procurements. Funding is needed
both to update military standards and keep them up to date.
Mcst cf the problems that occur after a ship has been
tuilt cculd prcbabij be solved by training and education.
NAVSEA is leading the way with programs like SEMCIF but
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training is a never ending process that the Navy must expand
up on. It should include everyone on board ship sines each
individual can have a detrimental effect on the electronic
systems cf the ship without being conscious of it. Adequate
funds must te provided so that all personnel will receive
the proper training.
Additional funds for studies cf possible problem areas
which are identified at the 1DTST nestings should be made to
provide actual data en which to base decisions. An example
cf this is the study done on the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) ,
where NAVSEA recently tasked Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Lab to assess the interference effects cf
the AN/SEC- 16 fan antenna with each of the subsystems of the
AN/SEG-55E radar. This ship was. selected for the study
because it was undergoing an c^erne.ul at the time.
Erass model studies should be utilized more often in
initial design and to evaluate later changes to the topside
configuration- This would help ensure EMC requirements are
teinc met.
As has teen shown earlier, the emanations from communi-
cations systems can seriously affect other systems and vice
versa, therefore it is important that communications os
treated as a system en an equal basis with other systems
instead cf being just added on where ever pcssible.
Therefore use of the knowledge gained by NOSC from model
studies should te expanded. If advice is sought from
HAVEIEX/SCSC earlier in the design phase, {much before the
initial configuration is used for the brass model study) the
communications antennas could be better integrated into the
piacenent process.
Eclicwing the recommendations of ilr. Mangulis in
£fief. 19], metheds to grade all types of radar blockage
should te developed. The blockage criteria could then give
design engineers a tetter idea of how the placement of
systems inpacts en the operational capability of a system.
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Since the final design depends on the SHA?2/SE:% he
should te brought into the process earlier so that when
reco attended configurations are forwarded, the likelihood of
approval will be enhanced. This should also help speed up
the design process by reducing the number of iterations
after the SHAPH receives the result.
A greaxer emphasis should be put on in-house design and
the training needed to accomplish it while knowledgeable
personnel are still in government: service.
A checkoff list should be developed so that no area of
cesicn is left cut cf the decision process. For example,
[Ref. 27], suggests that
Prior to NAVSEA 06 approval of a topside desian/anter.na
arrangement for New Construction, Conversions-
Modernizations of surface ships as recommenced.ps by
NAVEIEX/NCSC, a review of the recommended design
(should) be conducted by both NAVSEA Cede 61 (Combat
Systems Engineering Group) and NAVSEA code 62 (Surface
Warfare Systens Group); This method would permit
discovery cf potential degradation problems early en and
potentially reduce cost and schedule impacts.
Having this checkoff list signed by the head of each grcup
would ensure that groups whose systems are involved in the
topside configuration of a ship would be aware of each step
cf the design process. Hopefully, better system interaction
at lower costs should be a major result.
Unfortunately, ret much can be done about the limited
amount cf space en beard a ship. It is, however, possible
to either lewer the requirements for smaller snips such as
giving up an ASM or AAW capability or, if that proves
infeasible, to expect to build ships that are large enough
in length to accommodate the required systems.
Gfr should be specified in all ships in order to
minimize future EMI problems. As an alternative, very
strict ccr.trel contractors might be appropriate.
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Degradation caused by the placement cf =xtra equipment
en ships after they have become operational shculd be
minimized. Because so many ships may have such equipment
add = d to their topside decks, it may behoove the design
engineers to consider the possibility and to allow space for
additional temporary equipment in an area that will have the
least impact to the present configuration.
52

LIST OF EE] ? EHENCES
1. law, I. Em, "Topside Antenna System Design", Naval Sea
Systems Command Jo urn al. Vol. 29 Number 2, o.~ ~1T3-7EJ
"Barcn-Iprll^TSlS*:
2. SF.A 061 Staff, "Getting Smarter About Shipboard Hill",
Naval Sea Sy_st€irs Jjiurnal, Volume 27 No. 2, p. 2-9,
flarcn-lprij. IVl'BI
3. Gottlieb, I. M. , "From Smoke Signals tc Spread
Spectrum- Military Communications Decides Who Wins the
War", Military £lf.£t^onic:"/Counter measures, c. '-»2-47,
December "TTTB'Z.
4. White, D. R. J., A Handbook en Electrical Nci.se and
Eljct rcmaanet ic Interference "SpecirTcat ions, D*cn~" White
Consultants, Trc.,~7oIume T7 1*9777 ~
5. Prcut, F. M. , Eaksr, B- C. , CDE, USN, and DeMattia, H.
J., "Combatant Capability Assessment Status in the
Ship Desigr. Process", Naval Engineer Jo urn al , Vol. 86
nc. 3, p. 56-66, June T77T.
6. Graham, C. , CDS, USN, "rfhat Every Subsystem Engineer
Shculd Know About Ship Design-But Does Not Ask", Na val
E.2Sin€ers J£uri3i, Vol. 90 No. 3, p. 63-91, June T9T87
7. Cll€r, J. S., Jr., CAPT, USN (Ret), "The Navy's
Tactical Eiectrcmagne tic Prcgra a-Prcblem or Panacea",
Naval Engineer Journal, Vol. 90 Nc. 5, p. 51-55,
ctcEer 7978.
8. Gartiey, C. E. - Jr., "Ship Electronic System
E
Degradation", Navai Engine Journal, Vci. 90 Nc . 5,
.41-49, Cctol€r_197"8T
S. R-fsrence Data for Radio Engineers, sixth edition
1981, Howard W. Sams & Co., Inc., a subsidiary cf ITT
Ccrp.
10. Manual of Regulations and Procedures for federal Radio
Freguercy Manacement, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration of the U. S. Department of
Ccumerce, revised May 1982
11. Fell, B. , "An Introduction to Radar Concepts", RCA
ZH£~£*SL/ vcl 23/no. 5, p. 14-24, Feb/Mar 1978.
53

12. Miyers, J. M., "The U. S. Navy Combat Readiness
El€ctrcmaaiietic Analysis and Measurement (CFEAH)
Program", ' 1979 IEEE Inter national Symposium or EMC",
£• 2Q8-21Q.-T919: _J ~ —
13. The Electronics Ma terial Officer 1 s Guide to Shipboard
STIc^f cm a emetic ijvteriersnce Control, "UaviT "Sea
Systeiis Coimana, revised lugust i yaO
14. "Practical Ccntrcllership Ccurse", Naval Postgra duate





aw, Preston E. f Jr., "Accommodating Antenna Systems
in the Ship Design^ Process", Naval Engineer Jcar^j^.,
15. L
Vcl. 91 Nc. 1, p:65-7 5, Fabruary~T9797
Spaulding f K. E., and Johnson, A.F., "Management of
Ship Eesian at the Naval Ship Engineering Center",
Naval Engineer Journal, Vol. 88 No. 1, p. 27-44,
relfuafy 7T757
Rcckway, Dr. J. H., and Du Brul, D. W., "Performance
Prediction Analysis for Shipboard Antenna Systems"
Naval Engineer Journal, Vol. 89 No. 5, p. 3 3-4,),
Cc?c"5€f~"TT777
cEachen, J. P., "On Getting Our EM Act Together and
utting it on a Navy Ship", Naval En gineer Journal.





19. Manguiis, V., Abstract to "Criteria for Optimum
Distribution of Fire Control System Radar Bicckaqe",
Naval Enginee r Journal, Vol. 91 No. 4, p. 77-81,lugust-T^7Trg"
Leopold, Dr. B., "Innovation Adoption in the Naval
Ship Design", Nava. Engineer Journal, Vol. 89 No. 6, p.
3 5-52, Decembef-TT777
21. Johnson, Dr. R. S. , "The Changing Nature of the 0. S.
Navy Ship Desian Process", Naval rnaineer Jcurr^l,
Vcl. 92 No. 2, p. 88-1 13, Aprii~77HU. ~~ ~
22. Hundley, W. H., Comments to article "The FFG-7 Class
Design-Impact bv INSURV Trials", Naval jgi ers
i22UI£al, *ci- 54 No. 3, p. 106-107, June~T?H2.—
Naval Postgraduate School Report-62 A377090 1 , T ESSAC




24. Sinter- D. B. , and Carstensen, E. 7 t , "HatCorrective Action Program (WCAP) /Pilot Shicyard
Project: Resolving EMI Problems in Conjunction" with
the Ship Overhaul process", Naval En gin eer Journal,
Vol. 94 No. 1, p. 41-46, Feoruary~79 827
25. NEIC-TC-192, Alternate Design Approaches for JJ-30 MHz
Antennas on Dl"2's, by~*H~ K. Lanaslcov, p. TU6, T5 July
79727
26.
:7. Naval Sea Svstems
SEA-62Z1C1, Sutiect:
Command Memorandum for fi<=cord:
Communication, Fire Control, and
liJalilliii Terf crlance.





k Handbook Series en Electromagnetic Interf ersr.ee and
Compatibility, First edition. Volume '5, Doc fohite
Consultants, inc., 1 S72.
Ealdwin, T. 3., Jr. ar. d Capraro, G. T. . "Intraeysten
Electromagnetic Compatibility Program (IEMCAP) ", TEES
Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility. Vol. Z$Z'=r21.
fio. TJ, Tlcvelbef 13B1Z
Eiondi, E. J. and Kruger, B. E. , "The Unimast Ccncept-A
Major Departure in Shipboard Radar Antenna Philcscpay",
Naiii M2~R^§£ J carnal. Vol. 93 No. 2, April 1981.
Chase- H. H.- and others, "A Method of Control of shictoard
Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet, CI3CPACELT
INSTRUCTION 9407.1, 9 June 1961.
Garrett, J. ?. , Hardie, E. L. , and Rogers, P. A., "let's
Eesign Cut EMI!", Ncval Engineer Journal, Vol. 94 No. 1,
abruary 1980.
Jolliff, J. V. , CDR, USN, "Improvements in Ship Construction
Techniques tc Reduce Electromagnetic Interference", Naval
Engineer Journal, Vol. 86 No. 2, April 1974.
Kane, H. P., "Remote Sensors, Contemporary Weapons and
Comsat Shio Design", Naval Engin eer Journal. Vol. 94 No. 1
.
ebruary 1982.
Kant, M., "Apply inq EMC Technology to the Next Generation of
Navy Ships", 1 982 IEEE International Symposium en EMC,
September 8-10, ~H9H2.
McEachen, J. P. and Mills, H. K. , "The Shipboard
Electromagnetic Compatibility Improvement Program (SEMCIP)-A
56

Program fcr the Operating Fleet", Navii En gineer Journal,
Vol. 88 Nc. 5, October 1976.
Meyers, J. M., "The a. S. Navy Combat Readiness
Electromagnetic Analysis and Measurement (CREAM) Program",
197 9 IEEE Inter rational SX!2£osium on EMC, October 9-11,
Naval Postgraduate School, NPS67-80-0Q 1 , Sh: Arrangements
and Combat System Performan ce, by A. E. EuhsT January "T3T07
Naval Ship Engineering Center, NAVSEC Report 6 174-77-1064,
Accommodating Antenna Systems in the Snip Design Process, by
pT-ET-IawTl May~"lT77. x * —
Naval Surface Weapons Center, "The Commanding Officer's
Guide to the Shipboard Electromagnetic Environment", Jane
1977.
Sellinger. A. 3., "A Systems ADcroach to Shipboard HE
Communications", Naval Engineer Journal, Vol. 86 Nc. 4,
August 1974.
Skolrik, H. I., Sadar Handb ook, McGraw-Hill, 1970.
Smith, E. K., "Ihe Natural Radio Noise Source Environment",
198 2 IEEE Internatio nal Sy mposium on EMC, September 3-10,
Stratton, A. W., "Ihe Absorption and Eeradiaticn of cadio
waves by Oxygen and water VaDor in the Atmosphere",






1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 3940
4. Professor M. A. Morgan, Code 62Mw 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Naval Electronic Systems Command I





Naval Ocean Systems Center 1
Attn: G. Johnson, Code 312 2
San Diego, California 92152
7. Naval Sea Systems Command 1
Attn: J. D. Tedder SEA-62Z1C1
Washington, D.C. 20 362
8 S . Logan 1
TRW Code 527/715
P. 0. Box 1310
San Bernadino, California 92402
9. Dr. Richard Adler, Code 6 2Ab 1
Naval Postgradaute School
Monterey, California 93940






Attn: Mr, Ken Egan, Navy Tech Rep
Moore stown, Mew Jersey 080 57
12. LT Janice Lai
NAVCAMS Med Box 10 7 6









c.l The impact of electro
magnetic interference
on surface ship antenna
placement.







on surface ship antenna
placement.
I he impact ot electromagnetic interteren
3 2768 002 11276 5
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
